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Science is facing a “replication crisis” in which many experimental findings are irreplicable and
likely false. Does this imply that many scientific facts are false as well? To find out, we explore
the process by which a claim becomes fact. We model the community’s confidence in a claim as
a Markov process with successive published results shifting the degree of belief. Publication bias
in favor of positive findings influences the distribution of published results. We find that unless a
sufficient fraction of negative results are published, false claims frequently can become canonized
as fact. Data-dredging, p-hacking, and similar behaviors exacerbate the problem. When results
become easier to publish as a claim approaches acceptance as a fact, however, true and false claims
can be more readily distinguished. To the degree that the model reflects the real world, there may
be serious concerns about the validity of purported facts in some disciplines.
I. INTRODUCTION
Science is a process of collective knowledge creation in
which researchers use experimental, theoretical, and ob-
servational approaches to develop a naturalistic under-
standing of the world. In the development of a scientific
field, certain claims stand out as both significant and
stable in the face of further experimentation [1]. Once
a claim reaches this stage of widespread acceptance as
true, it has transitioned from claim to fact. This tran-
sition, which we call canonization, is often indicated by
some or all of the following: a canonized fact can be taken
for granted rather than treated as an open hypothesis in
the subsequent primary literature; tests that do no more
than to confirm previously canonized facts are seldom
considered publication-worthy; and canonized facts be-
gin to appear in review papers and textbooks without
the company of alternative hypotheses. Of course the
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veracity of so-called facts may be called back into ques-
tion [2, 3], but for time being the issue is considered to be
settled. Note that we consider facts to be epistemologi-
cal rather than ontological: a claim is a fact because it is
accepted by the relevant community, not because it ac-
curately reflects or represents underlying physical reality
[1, 3].
But what is the status of these facts in light of the repli-
cation crisis purportedly plaguing science today? Large
scale analyses have revealed that many published papers
in fields ranging from cancer biology to psychology to eco-
nomics cannot be replicated in subsequent experiments
[4–10]. One possible explanation is that many published
experiments are not replicable because many of their con-
clusions are ontologically false [11, 12].
If many experimental findings are ontologically false,
does it follow that many scientific facts are ontologically
untrue? Not necessarily. Claims of the sort that become
facts are rarely if ever tested directly in their entirety. In-
stead, such claims typically comprise multiple subsidiary
hypotheses which must be individually verified. Thus
multiple experiments are usually required to establish a
claim. Some of these may include direct replications, but
more typically an ensemble of distinct experiments will
produce multiple lines of evidence before a claim is ac-
cepted by the community.
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2For example, as molecular biologists worked to unravel
the details of the eukaryotic RNA interference (RNAi)
pathway in the early 2000s, they wanted to understand
how the RNAi pathway was initiated. Based on work
with Drosophila cell lines and embryo extracts, one group
of researchers made the claim that the RNAi pathway
is initiated by the Dicer enzyme which slices double-
stranded RNA into short fragments of 20-22 amino acids
in length [13]. Like many scientific facts, this claim was
too broad to be validated directly in a single experiment.
Rather, it comprised a number of subsidiary assertions:
an enzyme called Dicer exists in eukaryotic cells; it is es-
sential to initiate the RNAi pathway; it binds dsRNA and
slices it into pieces; it is distinct from the enzyme or en-
zyme complex that destroys targeted messenger RNA; it
is ubiquitous across eukaryotes that exhibit RNAi path-
way. Researchers from numerous labs tested these sub-
sidiary hypotheses or aspects thereof to derive numerous
lines of convergent evidence in support of the original
claim. While the initial breakthrough came from work
in Drosophila melanogaster cell lines [13], subsequent re-
search involved in establishing this fact drew upon in
vitro and in vivo studies, genomic analyses, and even
mathematical modeling efforts, and spanned species in-
cluding the fission yeast Schizosaccharomyces pombe, the
protozoan Giardia intestinalis, the nemotode Caenorhab-
ditis elegans, the flowering plant Arabidopsis thaliana,
mice, and humans [14]. Ultimately, sufficient support-
ing evidence accumulated to establish as fact the original
claim about Dicer’s function.
Requiring multiple studies to establish a fact is no
panacea, however. The same processes that allow pub-
lication of a single incorrect result can also lead to the
accumulation of sufficiently many incorrect findings to
establish a false claim as fact [15].
This risk is exacerbated by publication bias [16–25].
Publication bias arises when the probability that a scien-
tific study is published is not independent of its results
[16]. As a consequence, the findings from published tests
of a claim will differ in a systematic way from the findings
of all tests of the same claim [22, 26].
Publication bias is pervasive. Authors have systematic
biases regarding which results they consider worth writ-
ing up; this is known as the “file drawer problem” or “out-
come reporting bias” [17, 24]. Journals similarly have bi-
ases about which results are worth publishing. These two
sources of publication bias act equivalently in the model
developed here, and thus we will not attempt to sepa-
rate them. Nor would separating them be simple; even if
authors’ behavior is the larger contributor to publication
bias [23, 25], they may simply be responding appropri-
ately to incentives imposed by editorial preferences for
positive results.
What kinds of results are most valued? Findings of sta-
tistically significant differences between groups or treat-
ments tend to be viewed as more worthy of submission
and publication than those of non-significant differences.
Correlations between variables are often considered more
interesting than the absence of correlations. Tests that
reject null hypotheses are commonly seen as more note-
worthy than tests that fail to do so. Results that are
interesting in any of these ways can be described as “pos-
itive”.
A substantial majority of the scientific results pub-
lished appear to be positive ones [27]. It is relatively
straightforward to measure the fraction of published re-
sults that are negative. One extensive study found that
in 2007, more than 80% of papers reported positive find-
ings, and this number exceeded 90% in disciplines such
as psychology and ecology [28]. Moreover, the fraction
of publications reporting positive results has increased
over the past few decades. While this high prevalence of
positive results could in principle result in part from ex-
perimental designs with increasing statistical power and
a growing preference for testing claims that are believed
likely to be true, publication bias doubtless contributes
as well [28].
How sizable is this publication bias? To answer that,
we need to estimate the fraction of negative results that
are published, and doing so can be difficult because we
rarely have access to the set of findings that go unpub-
lished. The best available evidence of this sort comes
from registered clinical trials. For example, in 2008 meta-
analysis of 74 FDA-registered studies of antidepressants
[26]. In that analysis, 37 of 38 positive studies were pub-
lished as positive results, but only 3 of 24 negative studies
were published as negative results. An additional 5 neg-
ative studies were re-framed as positive for the purposes
of publication. Thus, negative studies were published at
scarcely more than 10% the rate of positive studies.
We would like to understand how the possibility of mis-
leading experimental results and the prevalence of pub-
lication bias shape the creation of scientific facts. Math-
ematical models of the scientific process can help us un-
derstand the dynamics by which scientific knowledge is
produced and, consequently, the likelihood that elements
of this knowledge are actually correct. In this paper, we
look at the way in which repeated efforts to test a scien-
tific claim establish this claim as fact or cause it to be
rejected as false.
We develop a mathematical model in which succes-
sive publications influence the community’s perceptions
around the likelihood of a given scientific claim. Positive
results impel the claim toward fact, whereas negative re-
sults lead in the opposite direction. Describing this pro-
cess, Bruno Latour [3] compared the fate of a scientific
claim to that of a rugby ball, pushed alternatively to-
ward fact or falsehood by the efforts of competing teams,
its fate determined by the balance of their collective ac-
tions. Put in these terms, our aim in the present paper
is to develop a formal model of how the ball is driven up
and down the epistemological pitch until one of the goal
lines is reached. In the subsequent sections, we outline
the model, explain how it can be analyzed, present the
results that we obtain, and consider its implications for
the functioning of scientific activity.
3II. MODEL
In this section, we will develop a simplified model
of scientific activity, designed to capture the important
qualitative features of fact-creation as a dynamic process.
A. Model description
We explore a simple model in which researchers se-
quentially test a single claim until the scientific commu-
nity becomes sufficiently certain of its truth or falsehood
that no further experimentation is needed. Our model is
conceptually related to those developed in refs. [15, 29],
though it is considerably simpler than either since we
only consider a single claim at a time.
Figure 1 provides a schematic illustration of the ex-
perimentation and publication process. We begin with
a claim which is ontologically either true or false. Re-
searchers sequentially conduct experiments to test the
claim; these experiments are typically not direct replica-
tions of one another, but rather distinct approaches that
lend broader support to the claim. Each experiment re-
turns either a positive outcome supporting the claim, or
a negative outcome contravening it. For mathematical
simplicity, we assume all tests to have the same error
rates, in the sense that if the claim under scrutiny is
false, then investigators obtain false positives with prob-
ability α. Conversely, when the claim is true, investiga-
tors obtain false negatives with probability β. We take
these error rates to be the ones that are conventionally
associated with statistical hypothesis testing, so that α is
equivalent to the significance level (technically, the size)
of a statistical test and 1− β is the test’s power. We as-
sume that, as in any reasonable test, a true claim is more
likely to generate a positive result than a negative one:
1 − β > α. A broader interpretation of α and β beyond
statistical error does not change the interpretation of our
results.
After completing a study, the investigators may at-
tempt to publish their experimental results. However,
publication bias occurs in that the result of the exper-
iment influences the chance that a study is written up
as a paper and accepted for publication. Positive re-
sults are eventually published somewhere with proba-
bility ρ1 while negative results are eventually published
somewhere with probability ρ0. Given the reluctance of
authors to submit negative results and of journals to pub-
lish them, we expect that in general ρ1 > ρ0.
Finally, readers attempt to judge whether a claim is
true by consulting the published literature only. For
modeling purposes, we will consider a best-case scenario,
in which the false positive and false negative rates α
and β are established by disciplinary custom or accepted
benchmarks, and readers perform Bayesian updating of
their beliefs based upon these known values. In practice,
these values may not be as well standardized or widely
reported as would be desirable. Moreover, readers are un-
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FIG. 1. Conducting and reporting the test of a claim.
In our model, a scientific claim is either true or false. Re-
searchers conduct an experiment which either supports or
fails to the support the claim. True claims are correctly sup-
ported with probability 1−β while false claims are incorrectly
supported with probability α. Next, the researchers may at-
tempt to publish their results. Positive results that support
the claim are published with probability ρ1 whereas nega-
tive results that fail to support the claim are published with
probability ρ0. This process then repeats, with additional ex-
periments conducted until the claim is canonized as fact or
rejected as false.
likely to be this sophisticated in drawing their inferences.
Instead readers are likely to form subjective beliefs in an
informal fashion based on a general assessment of the ac-
cumulated positive and negative results and the strength
of each. But the Bayesian updating case provides a well-
defined model under which to explore the distortion of
belief by publication bias.
The problem is that the results described in the pub-
lished literature are now biased by the selection of which
articles are drafted and accepted for publication. We as-
sume that readers are unaware of the degree of this bias,
and that they fail to correct for publication bias in draw-
ing inferences from the published data. It may seem pes-
simistic that researchers would fail to make this correc-
tion, but much of the current concern over the replication
crisis in science is predicated on exactly this. Moreover,
it is usually impossible for a researcher to accurately es-
timate the degree of publication bias in a given domain.
B. Model dynamics
Consider a claim that the community initially consid-
ers to have probability q0 of being true. Researchers it-
eratively test hypotheses that bear upon the claim until
it accumulates either sufficient support to be canonized
as fact, or sufficient counter-evidence to be discarded as
false. If the claim is true, the probability that a single test
leads to a positive publication is (1− β)ρ1, and the cor-
responding probability of a negative publication is βρ0.
The remaining probability corresponds to results of the
4test not being published. If the claim is false, these prob-
abilities are αρ1 and (1− α)ρ0 for positive and negative
published outcomes, respectively. Given that a claim is
true, the probability that a published test of that claim
reports a positive outcome is therefore
ωT =
(1− β)ρ1
(1− β)ρ1 + βρ0 . (1)
For a false claim, the probability that a published test is
positive is
ωF =
αρ1
αρ1 + (1− α)ρ0 . (2)
Because only the ratio of ρ1 to ρ0 matters for the pur-
poses of our model, we set ρ1 to 1 for the remainder of
the paper. We initially assume that ρ0 is constant, but
will relax this latter assumption later.
To formalize ideas, consider a sequence of published
outcomes X, and let Yk be the number of positive pub-
lished outcomes in the first k terms of X. When the prob-
abilities of publishing a negative result ρ0 is constant, the
outcomes of published experiments are exchangeable ran-
dom variables. Thus after k published tests, the distri-
bution of Yk for a true claim is the binomial distribution
Bin(k, ωT ) and for a false claim is Bin(k, ωF ). More-
over, the sequence {Yk}∞k=1 is a Markov chain. When the
extent of publication bias is known, we can compute the
conditional probability that a claim is true, given Yk = y,
as
ωyT (1− ωT )k−yq0
ωyT (1− ωT )k−yq0 + ωyF (1− ωF )k−y(1− q0)
. (3)
We now consider the consequences of drawing infer-
ences based on the published data alone, without cor-
recting for publication bias. For model readers who do
not condition on publication bias, let qk(y) be the per-
ceived, conditional probability that a claim is true given
Yk = y. We say “perceived” because these readers use
Bayes’ Law to update qk, but do so under the incorrect
assumption that there is no publication bias, i.e., that
ρ0 = ρ1 = 1. To ease the narrative, we refer to the per-
ceived conditional probability that a claim is true as the
“belief” that the claim is true. Expressing this formally,
qk(y) =
(1− β)yβk−yq0
(1− β)yβk−yq0 + αy(1− α)k−y(1− q0) . (4)
Note that without publication bias, we have ωT = (1−β)
and ωF = α, and thus eq. 3 coincides with eq. 4.
From the perspective of an observer who is unaware
of any publication bias, the pair (Yk, k) is a sufficient
statistic for the random variable A ∈ {True,False} rep-
resenting the truth value of the claim in question. This
follows from the definition of statistical sufficiency and
the fact that
prob
[
A = True|Yk, k, {Yi}ki=1
]
= qk(y)
= prob [A = True|Yk, k] .
By analogous logic, the pair (Yk, k) is also a sufficient
statistic for an observer aware of the degree of publication
bias provided that the publication probabilities ρ0 and ρ1
are constant.
We envision science as proceeding iteratively until the
belief that a claim is true is sufficiently close to 1 that the
claim is canonized as fact, or until belief is sufficiently
close to 0 that the claim is discarded as false. We let
τ0 and τ1 be the belief thresholds at which a claim is
rejected or canonized as fact, respectively (0 < τ0 < τ1 <
1), and refer to these as evidentiary standards. In our
analysis, we make the simplifying assumption that the
evidentiary standards are symmetric, i.e., τ0 = 1−τ1. We
describe the consequences of relaxing this assumption in
the Discussion.
Thus, mathematically, we model belief in the truth of
a claim as a discrete-time Markov chain {qk}∞k=0 with
absorbing boundaries at the evidentiary standards for
canonization or rejection (Fig. 2A). When the Markov
chain represents belief, its possible values lie in the inter-
val from 0 to 1. For mathematical convenience, however,
it is often helpful to convert belief to the log odds scale,
that is, ln(qk/(1− qk)). Some algebra shows that the log
odds of belief qk(y) can be written as
ln
(
qk(y)
1− qk(y)
)
= y ln
(
1− β
α
)
+ (k − y) ln
(
β
1− α
)
+ ln
(
q0
1− q0
)
. (5)
The log odds scale is convenient because, as eq. 5 shows,
each published positive outcome increases the log odds
of belief by a constant increment
d1 = ln
(
1− β
α
)
> 0
(Fig. 2B). Each published negative outcome decreases the
log odds of belief by
d0 = ln
(
β
1− α
)
< 0.
Below, we will see that much of the behavior of our model
can be understood in terms of the expected change in the
log odds of belief for each published outcome. For a true
claim, the expected change in the log odds of belief is
d1ωT + d0(1− ωT ) (6)
whereas for a false claim, the expected change in the log
odds of belief is
d1ωF + d0(1− ωF ). (7)
C. Computing canonization and rejection
probabilities
In general, we cannot obtain a closed-form expression
for the probability that a claim is canonized as fact or
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FIG. 2. A time-directed graph represents the evolution of belief over time. In panel A, the horizontal axis indicates
the number of experiments published and the vertical axis reflects the observer’s belief, quantified as the probability that the
claim is true. The process begins at the single point at far left with an initial belief q0. Each subsequent experiment either
supports the claim, moving to the next node up and right, or contradicts the claim, moving to the next node down and right. At
yellow nodes, the status of the claim is as yet undecided. At green nodes, it is canonized as fact, and at blue nodes, it is rejected
as false. The black horizontal lines show the evidentiary standards (τ0 and τ1). The red path shows one possible trajectory, in
which a positive experiment is followed by a negative, then two positives, then a negative, etc., ultimately becoming canonized
as fact when it reaches the upper boundary. Panel B shows the same network, but with the vertical axis representing log odds
and using color to indicate the probability that the process visits that node. In log-odds space, each published positive result
shifts belief by the constant distance d1 > 0 and each negative result by a different distance d0 < 0. Shown here (in both panel
A and B) is a false claim with false positive rate α = 0.2, false negative rate β = 0.4, publication probabilities p0 = 0.1 and
p1 = 1, and initial belief q0 = 0.1. In this case, the claim is likely to be canonized as fact, despite being false.
for the probability that it is rejected as false. We can,
however, derive recursive expressions for the probabili-
ties that after k published experiments a claim has been
canonized as fact, has been discarded as false, or remains
undecided. From these, it is straightforward to compute
the canonization and rejection probabilities numerically
to any desired level of precision.
For each number of published experiments k, the state
space for Yk is simply Yk ∈ {0, 1, . . . , k}. Partition this
state space as follows:
Ck = {y : qk(y) > τ1}
Ik = {y : qk(y) ∈ [τ0, τ1]}
Rk = {y : qk(y) < τ0} .
That is, Ck is the set of outcomes corresponding to a belief
greater than the evidentiary standard for canonization,
Rk is the set of outcomes corresponding to a belief less
than the evidentiary standard for rejection, and Ik is the
set of outcomes corresponding to belief in between these
two standards (the “interior”). Let T be the number of
publications until a claim is either canonized or rejected.
Formally,
T = min {k : Yk ∈ Ck ∪Rk} .
For a true claim, we calculate the probability of canon-
ization as follows. (A parallel set of equations gives the
probability of canonization for a false claim.) For each
y ∈ Ik, define pk(y) = Prob {Yk = y, T > k}. That is,
pk(y) is the probability that there are exactly y positive
outcomes in the first k publications, and the claim has
yet to be canonized or rejected by publication k. Sup-
pose these probabilities are known for each y ∈ Ik. Then
for each y ∈ Ik+1, these probabilities can be found re-
cursively by
pk+1(y) = ωT pk(y − 1) + (1− ωT )pk(y).
For computational purposes, in the recursion above we
define pk(y) = 0 whenever y /∈ Ik. The probability that
the claim has yet to be canonized or rejected by publica-
tion k is simply
Prob {T > k} =
∑
y∈Ik
pk(y).
Let φk be the probability that a claim is first canonized
at publication k. Formally,
φk =
∑
y:y−1∈Ik−1 and y∈Ck
ωT pk−1(y − 1).
Let k? be the smallest value of k for which
Prob {T > k} ≤ . To calculate the probability of canon-
ization, we calculate pk(y) for all k = 1, . . . , k
?. The
probability of canonization is then
∑k?
k=1 φk. For the
analyses in this paper, we have set  = 10−4.
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FIG. 3. ROC curves reveal that true claims are almost always canonized as fact. In the receiver operating charac-
teristic (ROC) curves shown here, the vertical axis represents the probability that a true claim is correctly canonized as fact,
and the horizontal axis represents the probability that a false one is incorrectly canonized as fact. Panel A: lax evidentiary
standards τ0 = 0.1 and τ1 = 0.9. Panel B: strict evidentiary standards τ0 = 0.001 and τ1 = 0.999. Error rates and initial
belief are α = 0.05, β = 0.2, and q0 = 0.5. Each point along the ROC curve corresponds to a different value of negative
publication rate, ρ0, as indicated by color. Grey regions of the curve correspond to the unlikely situations in which ρ0 > ρ1 = 1,
i.e., negative results are more likely to be published than positive ones. The figures reveal two important points. First, when
negative results are published at any rate ρ0 ≤ 1, the vast majority of true claims are canonized as fact. Second, when negative
results are published at a low rate (ρ0 less than 0.3 or 0.2 depending on evidentiary standards), many false claims will also be
canonized as true.
III. RESULTS
We focus throughout the paper on the dynamic pro-
cesses by which false claims are canonized as facts, and
explore how the probability of this happening depends on
properties of the system such as the publication rate of
negative results, the initial beliefs of researchers, the rates
of experimental error, and the degree of evidence required
to canonize a claim. In principle, the converse could be a
problem as well: true claims could be discarded as false.
However, this is rare in our model. Publication bias fa-
vors the publication of positive results and therefore will
not tend to cause true claims to be discarded as false,
irrespective of other parameters. We first establish this,
and then proceed to a detailed examination of how scien-
tific experimentation and publication influences the rate
at which false claims are canonized as fact.
A. True claims tend to be canonized as facts
In our model, true claims are almost always canonized
as facts. Figure 3 illustrates this result in the form of a re-
ceiver operating characteristic (ROC) curve. Holding the
other parameters constant, the curve varies the negative
publication rate ρ0, and uses the vertical and horizon-
tal axes to indicate the probabilities that true and false
claims respectively are canonized as fact.
One might fear that as the probability ρ0 of publish-
ing negative results climbs toward unity, the risk of re-
jecting a true claim would increase dramatically as well.
This is not the case. Even as the probability of publish-
ing negative results approaches 1, the risk of rejecting
a true claim is low when evidentiary standards are lax
(Fig. 3A), and negligible when evidentiary standards are
strict (Fig. 3B).
This result turns out to be general across a broad range
of parameters. Assuming the mild requirements that (i)
tests of a true claim are more likely to result in positive
publications than negative publications (i.e., ωT > 1/2,
or equivalently (1−β) > βρ0), and (ii) positive published
outcomes increase belief that the claim is true (d1 > 0, or
equivalently (1−β) > α), true claims are highly likely to
be canonized as facts. The exceptions occur only when
minimal evidence is needed to discard a claim, i.e., when
initial belief is small (q0 ≈ τ0). In such cases a bit of bad
luck—the first one or two published experiments report
false negatives, for example—can cause a true claim to
be rejected. But otherwise, truth is sufficient for canon-
ization.
Unfortunately, truth is not required for canonization.
The risk of canonizing a false claim—shown on the hor-
izontal axis value in figure 3—is highly sensitive to the
rate at which negative results are published. When neg-
ative results are published with high probability, false
claims are seldom canonized. But when negative results
are published with lower probability, many false claims
are canonized.
Thus we see that the predominant risk associated with
publication bias is the canonization of false claims. In
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FIG. 4. Publishing negative outcomes is essential for
rejecting false claims. Probability that a false claim is
incorrectly canonized, as a function of the negative publica-
tion rate. Throughout, initial belief is q0 = 0.5, and indi-
vidual data series show false positive rates α = 0.05 (yel-
low), 0.10, . . . , 0.25 (red). Top row: weak evidentiary stan-
dards τ0 = 0.1 and τ1 = 0.9. Panel A: false negative rate
β = 0.2. Panel B: β = 0.4. Panels C–D: similar to panels
A–B, with more demanding evidentiary standards τ0 = 0.001
and τ1 = 0.999.
the remainder of this analysis, we focus on this risk of
incorrectly establishing a false claim as a fact.
B. Publication of negative results is essential
As we discussed in the introduction, authors and jour-
nals alike tend to be reluctant to publish negative results,
and as we found in the previous subsection, when most
negative results go unpublished, science performs poorly.
Here, we explore this relationship in further detail.
Figure 4 shows how the probability of erroneously can-
onizing a false claim as fact depends on the probability
ρ0 that a negative result is published. False claims are
likely to be canonized below a threshold rate of nega-
tive publication, and unlikely to be canonized above this
threshold. For example, when the false positive rate α is
0.05, the false negative rate β is 0.4, and the evidentiary
requirements are strong (yellow points in Panel 4D), a
false claim is likely to be canonized as fact unless nega-
tive results are at least 20% as likely as positive results
to be published.
Figure 4 also reveals that the probability of canonizing
false claims as facts depends strongly on both the false
positive rate and the false negative rate of the experi-
mental tests. As these error rates increase, an increas-
ingly large fraction of negative results must be published
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FIG. 5. False canonization rates are relatively insen-
sitive to initial belief, unless experimental tests are
inaccurate and evidentiary standards are weak. Prob-
ability that a false claim is mistakenly canonized as a true fact
vs. prior belief for various negative publication rates. Top row:
weak evidentiary standards τ0 = 0.1 and τ1 = 0.9. Panel A:
false positive rate α = 0.05, false negative rate β = 0.2, and
publication rate of negative results ρ0 = 0.025 (light green),
0.05, 0.1, 0.2, 0.4 (dark green). Panel B: α = 0.2, β = 0.4, and
ρ0 = 0.1 (light green), 0.3, 0.4, 0.5, 1 (dark green). Panels C–
D: similar to panels A–B, with more demanding evidentiary
standards τ0 = 0.001 and τ1 = 0.999.
to preserve the ability to discriminate between true and
false claims.
C. Initial beliefs usually do not matter much
If the scientific process is working properly, it should
not automatically confirm what we already believe, but
rather it should lead us to change our beliefs based on
evidence. Our model indicates that in general, this is the
case.
Figure 5 shows how the probability that a false claim is
canonized as true depends on the initial belief q0 that the
claim is true. Under most circumstances, the probability
of canonization is relatively insensitive to initial belief.
False canonization rates depend strongly on initial belief
only when evidentiary standards are weak and experi-
ments are highly prone to error (Fig. 5B). In this case,
belief is a random walk without a systematic tendency
to increase or decrease with each published outcome, and
thus the odds of canonization or rejection depend most
strongly on the initial belief.
The step-function-like appearance of some of the re-
sults in Fig. 5, particularly Fig. 5A, is a real property
of the curves in question and not a numerical artifact.
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FIG. 6. Strengthening evidentiary requirements does
not necessarily decrease canonization of false facts. In
panel 6A, the false positive rate is α = 0.05, the false negative
rate is β = 0.2, the original belief in the claim is q0 = 0.5,
and the evidentiary standards are symmetric τ1 = 1− τ0. In
panel 6B, the false positive rate is increased to α = 0.25 while
the other parameters remain unchanged. Particularly in this
latter case, increasing evidentiary standards does not neces-
sarily decrease the rate at which false claims are canonized as
facts.
The “steps” arise because, when evidentiary standards
are weak, canonization or rejection often happens after
a small number of experiments. Because the number of
experiments must be integral, probabilities of false can-
onization can change abruptly when a small change in
initial belief increases or decreases the number of experi-
ments in the most likely path to canonization or rejection.
D. Stronger evidentiary standards do not reduce
the need to publish negative outcomes
We have seen in the previous sections that the scien-
tific process struggles to distinguish true from false claims
when the rate of publishing negative results is low. We
might hope that we could remedy this problem simply
by demanding more evidence before accepting a claim as
fact. Unfortunately, this is not only expensive in terms
of time and effort—sometimes it will not even help.
Figure 6 illustrates the problem. In this figure, we see
the probability of canonizing a false claim as a function of
negative publication rate for three different evidentiary
standards: τ0 = 0.1, τ0 = 0.01, and τ0 = 0.001. When
the false positive rate α is relatively low (Fig. 6A), in-
creasing the evidentiary requirements reduces the chance
of canonizing a false claim for negative publication rates
above 0.1 or so, but below this threshold there is no ad-
vantage to requiring stronger evidence. When the false
positive rate is higher (Fig. 6B), the situation is even
worse: for negative publication rates below 0.3 or so, in-
creasing evidentiary requirements actually increases the
chance of canonizing a false fact.
The limited benefits of strengthening evidentiary stan-
dards can be understood through the mathematical the-
ory of random walks [30]. In short, the thresholds of
−1
0
1
2
A: False hypothesis
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
α = 0.25
α = 0.2
α = 0.15
α = 0.1
α = 0.05
B: True hypothesis
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
Negative publication rate, ρ0
Ex
pe
cte
d 
ch
an
ge
 in
log
 o
dd
s o
f b
eli
ef
A: False claim B: True claim
 .
 . 0
 .
 . 0
 .α
α
α
α
α
FIG. 7. Scientific activity will tend to increase belief
in false claims if too few negative outcomes are pub-
lished. Expected change in log odds of belief vs. negative
publication rate for (A) false and (B) true claims. Lines show
false positive rates α = 0.05 (yellow), 0.10, . . . , 0.25 (red).
Other parameter values are false negative rate β = 0.2 and
positive publication rate ρ1 = 1.
belief for canonizing or rejecting a claim are absorbing
boundaries such that once belief attains either boundary,
the walk terminates and beliefs will not change further.
Increasing the evidentiary standards for canonization or
rejection is tantamount to increasing the distance be-
tween these boundaries and the initial belief state. Basic
results from the theory of random walks suggest that, as
the distance between the initial state and the boundaries
increases, the probability of encountering one boundary
before the other depends increasingly strongly on the av-
erage change in the log odds of belief at each step (ex-
periment), and less on the random fluctuations in belief
that arise from the stochasticity of the walk. Thus, for
exacting evidentiary standards, the probability of even-
tual canonization or rejection depends critically on the
average change in the log odds of belief for each experi-
ment. These are given by eq. 6 for a true claim and eq. 7
for a false one.
Figure 7 shows how the expected change in log odds
of belief varies in response to changes in the publication
rate of negative outcomes, for both false and true claim.
Critically, for false claims, if too few negative outcomes
are published, then on average each new publication will
increase the belief that the claim is true, because there
is a high probability this publication will report a pos-
itive result. Thus, paradoxically, scientific activity does
not help sort true claims from false ones in this case,
but instead promotes the erroneous canonization of false
claims. The only remedy for this state of affairs is to
publish enough negative outcomes that, on average, each
published result moves belief in the “correct” direction,
that is, towards canonization of true claims (a positive
average change per experiment in log odds of belief) and
rejection of false ones (a negative average change per ex-
periment in log odds of belief).
Two additional points are in order here. First, for true
claims, under most circumstances the expected change
in the log odds of belief is positive (Fig. 7B). That is,
9on average, scientific activity properly increases belief in
true claims, and thus the risk of incorrectly rejecting a
true claim is small (under reasonable evidentiary stan-
dards). Second, the observation that more exacting evi-
dentiary standards can occasionally increase the chance
of incorrectly canonizing a false claim is not much of an
argument in favor of weaker evidentiary standards. In
short, weaker standards cause canonization or rejection
to depend more strongly on the happenstance of the first
several published experiments. When scientific activity
tends to increase belief in a false claim, weaker eviden-
tiary standards appear beneficial because they increase
the chance that a few initial published negatives will lead
to rejection and bring a halt to further investigation.
While this is a logical result of the model, it is somewhat
tantamount to stating that, if scientific activity tends to
increase belief in false claims, then the best option is to
weaken the dependence on scientific evidence. More ro-
bust practices for rejecting false claims seem desirable.
E. P -hacking dramatically increases the probability
of canonizing false claims
Our model has been based on the optimistic premise
that the significance levels reported in each study accu-
rately reflect the actual false positive rates. This means
that there is only a 5% chance that a false claim will yield
a positive result at the α = 0.05 level.
In practice, reported significance levels can be mislead-
ing. Questionable research practices of all sorts can result
in higher-than-reported false positive rates; these include
p-hacking [31], outcome switching [32], unreported mul-
tiple comparisons [33], data dredging [34], HARKing—
hypothesizing after the results are known [35], data-
dependent analysis [36], and opportunistic stopping or
continuation [37]. Insufficient validation of new technolo-
gies, or even software problems can also drive realized er-
ror rates far above what is expected given stated levels of
statistical confidence (see e.g. ref. [38]). Research groups
may be positively disposed toward their prior hypotheses
or reluctant to contradict the work of closely allied labs.
Finally, industry-sponsored clinical trials often allow the
sponsors some degree of control over whether results are
published [39], resulting in an additional source of publi-
cation bias separate from the journal acceptance process.
To understand the consequences of these problems and
practices, we can extend our model to distinguish the ac-
tual false positive rate αact from nominal false positive
rate αnom which is reported in the paper and used by
readers to draw their inferences. We assume the actual
false positive rate is always at least as large as the nom-
inal rate, that is, αact ≥ αnom. In this scenario, the
probability that a false claims leads to a positive pub-
lished outcome depends on the actual false positive rate,
i.e.,
ωF =
αactρ1
αactρ1 + (1− αact)ρ0 .
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FIG. 8. p-hacking dramatically increases the chances
of canonizing false claims. Probability that a false claim is
canonized as fact vs. fraction of negative outcomes. Through-
out, all positive outcomes are published (p1 = 1), and the
nominal false positive rate is αnom = 0.05, the false nega-
tive rate is β = 0.2, and evidentiary standards are strong
(τ0 = 0.001 and τ1 = 0.999). Curves show actual false pos-
itive rates αact = 0.05 (yellow), 0.10, . . . , 0.25 (red). Com-
pared with Fig. 4C, in which the nominal rates are equal to
the actual rates, the probability of canonizing a false claim as
fact is substantially higher.
However, the change in belief following a positive or nega-
tive published outcome respectively depends on the nom-
inal false positive rate:
d1 = ln
(
1− β
αnom
)
d0 = ln
(
β
1− αnom
)
An inflated false positive rate makes it much more
likely that false claims will be canonized as true facts
(Fig. 8). For example, suppose the false negative rate is
β = 0.2, the nominal false positive rate is αnom = 0.05,
but the actual false positive rate is αact = 0.25. Even
eliminating publication bias against negative outcomes
(i.e., ρ0 = 1) and using strong evidentiary standards
does not eliminate the possibility that false claims will
be canonized as facts under these circumstances (Fig. 8).
Less dramatic inflation of the false positive rate leaves
open the possibility that true vs. false claims can be dis-
tinguished, but only if a higher percentage of negative
outcomes are published.
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F. Increasing negative publication rates as a claim
approaches canonization greatly increases accuracy
Thus far we have told a troubling story. Without high
probabilities of publication for negative results, the sci-
entific process may perform poorly at distinguishing true
claims from false ones. And there are plenty of reasons
to suspect that negative results may not always be likely
to be published.
However, authors, reviewers, and editors are all drawn
to unexpected results that challenge or modify prevalent
views—and for a claim widely believed to be true, a neg-
ative result from a well-designed study is surprising. As a
consequence, the probability of publishing a negative re-
sult may be higher for claims that are already considered
likely to be true [40, 41]
In a simulation of point estimation by successive exper-
imentation, de Winter and Happee considered an even
more extreme situation in which it is only possible to
publish results that contradict the prevailing wisdom [42].
They argue that this has efficiency benefits, but their re-
sults have been challenged persuasively by van Assen and
colleagues [43]. In any event, such a publication strategy
would not work in the framework we consider here, be-
cause a claim could neither be canonized nor rejected if
each new published result were required to contradict the
current beliefs of the community.
Some meta-analyses have revealed patterns consistent
with this model [44]. For example, when the fluctuat-
ing asymmetry hypothesis was proposed in evolution-
ary ecology, the initial publications exclusively reported
strong associations between symmetry and attractiveness
or mating success. As time passed, however, an increas-
ing fraction of the papers on this hypothesis reported
negative findings with no association between these vari-
ables [45]. A likely interpretation is that initially jour-
nals were reluctant to publish results inconsistent with
the hypothesis, but as it became better established, neg-
ative results came to be viewed as interesting and worthy
of publication [45–47].
To explore the consequences of this effect, we consider
a model in which the probability of publishing a negative
outcome increases linearly from a baseline value ρb when
belief in the claim is weak, to a maximum value of ρ0 =
1 when belief in the claim is strong. We assume that
the probability of publishing a negative outcome is ρ0 =
ρb + q(1 − ρb), where ρb is the baseline probability for
publishing negative outcomes, and q is the current belief.
As before, our agents are unaware of any publication bias
in updating their own beliefs.
Figure 9 indicates that dynamic publication rates can
markedly reduce (though not eliminate) the false canon-
ization rate under many scenarios. In particular, Fig. 9
suggests that even if it is difficult to publish negative out-
comes for claims already suspected to be false, we can still
accurately sort true claims from false ones provided that
negative outcomes are more readily published for claims
nearing canonization. In practice, this mechanism may
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FIG. 9. Publishing a larger fraction of negative out-
comes as belief increases lessens the chances of can-
onizing false claims. Probability that a false claim is mis-
takenly canonized as a true fact vs. baseline probability of
publishing a negative outcome. The baseline probability of
publishing a negative outcome is the probability that pre-
vails when belief in the claim is weak. The actual probability
of publishing a negative outcome increases linearly from the
baseline rate when belief is 0 to a value of 1 when belief is 1.
All other parameters are the same as in Fig. 4.
play an important role in preventing false results from
becoming canonized more frequently.
IV. DISCUSSION
In the model of scientific inquiry that we have de-
veloped here, publication bias creates serious problems.
While true claims will seldom be rejected, publication
bias has the potential to cause many false claims to be
mistakenly canonized as facts. This can be avoided only
if a substantial fraction of negative results are published.
But at present, publication bias appears to be strong,
given that only a small fraction of the published sci-
entific literature presents negative results. Presumably
many negative results are going unreported. While this
problem has been noted before [48], we do not know of
any previous formal analysis of its consequences regard-
ing the establishment of scientific facts.
A. Should scientists publish all of their results?
There is an active debate over whether science func-
tions most effectively when researchers publish all of their
results, or when they publish only a select subset of their
findings [15, 42, 43, 49]. In our model, we observe no ad-
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vantage to selective publication; in all cases treated we
find that false canonization decreases monotonically with
increasing publication of negative results. This seems log-
ical enough. Decision theory affirms that in the absence
of information costs, withholding information cannot on
average improve performance in a decision problem such
as the classification task we treat here [50–52]. As Good
[51] notes, a decision-maker “should use all the evidence
already available, provided that the cost of doing so is
negligible.”
Nonetheless, several research groups have argued that
selective publishing can be more efficient than publishing
the results of all studies. Clearly they must be implic-
itly or explicitly imposing costs of some sort on the acts
of publishing papers or reading them, and it can be in-
structive to see where these costs lie. One source of such
costs comes simply from the increased volume of scien-
tific literature that ensues when all results are published;
this is sometimes known as the “cluttered office” effect
[49]. If we envision that search costs increase with the
volume of literature, for example, it may be beneficial
not to publish everything.
Another possible cost is that of actually writing a pa-
per and going through the publication process. If prepar-
ing a paper for publication is costly relative to doing the
experiments which would be reported, it may be advan-
tageous to publish only a subset of all experimental re-
sults. This is the argument that de Winter and Happee
make when, in a mathematical model of point estima-
tion, they find that selective publication minimizes the
variance given the number of publications (as opposed to
the number of experiments conducted). Note, however,
that they assume a model of science in which experiments
are only published when they contradict the prevailing
wisdom—and that their results have been roundly chal-
lenged in a followup analysis [43].
McElreath and Smaldino [15] analyzed a model that is
more similar to ours in structure. As we do, they consider
repeated tests of binary-valued hypotheses. But rather
than focusing on a single claim at a time, they model
the progress of a group of scientists testing a suite of hy-
potheses. Based on this model, McElreath and Smaldino
conclude that there can be advantages to selective pub-
lication under certain conditions.
While selective publication certainly can ameliorate
the cluttered office problem—observed in their model as
the flocking of researchers to questions already shown
likely to be false—we are skeptical about the other advan-
tages to selective publication. McElreath and Smaldino’s
model and results appear to rely in part on their assump-
tion that “the only information relevant for judging the
truth of a hypothesis is its tally, the difference between
the number of published positive and the number of pos-
itive negative findings” (p. 3).
As a mathematical claim, this is incorrect. Presumably
the claim is instead intended to be a tactical assumption
that serves to simplify the analysis. But this assumption
is severely limiting. The tally is often an inadequate sum-
mary of the evidence in favor of a hypothesis. One can
see the problem with looking only at the tally by consid-
ering a simple example in which false positive rates are
very low, false negative rates are high, and all studies
are published. There is mild evidence that a hypothe-
sis is false if no positive studies and one negative study
have been published, but there is strong evidence that
the hypothesis is true if three positive and four negative
studies have been published. Yet both situations share
the same tally: −1. The same problem arises when pub-
lication bias causes positive and negative findings to be
published at different rates.
If one is forced to use only the tally to make decisions,
an agent can sometimes make better inferences by throw-
ing away some of the data (i.e., under selective publica-
tion). For example, when false negatives are common it
may be beneficial to suppress some fraction of the nega-
tive results lest they swamp any positive signal from true
positive findings. This is not the case when the agent
has access to complete information about the number of
positive and the number of negative results published.
As a result, it is unclear whether most of McElreath and
Smaldino’s arguments in favor of selective publication are
relevant to optimal scientific inference, or whether they
are consequences of the assumption that readers draw
their inferences based on the tally alone.
B. What do we do about the problem of
publication bias?
Several studies have indicated that much of the publi-
cation bias observed in science can be attributed to au-
thors not writing up null results, rather than journals
rejecting null results [23, 25, 53]. This does not necessar-
ily exonerate the journals; authors may be responding to
incentives that the journals have put in place [22]. Au-
thors may be motivated by other reputational factors as
well. It would be a very unusual job talk, promotion sem-
inar, or grant application that was based primarily upon
negative findings.
So what can we as a scientific community do? How can
we avoid canonizing too many false claims, so that we can
be confident in the veracity of most scientific facts? In
this paper, we have shown that strengthening evidentiary
standards does not necessarily help. In the presence of
strong publication bias, false claims become canonized
as fact not so much because of a few misleading chance
results, but rather because on average, misleading results
are more likely to be published than correct ones.
Fortunately, this problem may be ameliorated by sev-
eral current aspects of the publication process. In this
paper, we have modeled claims that have only one way of
generating “positive” results. For many scientific claims,
e.g. those like our Dicer example that propose partic-
ular mechanisms, this may be appropriate. In other
cases, however, results may be continuous: not only do
we care whether variables X and Y are correlated, but
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also we want to know about the strength of the corre-
lation, for example. This does not make the problem
go away, if stronger or highly significant correlations are
seen as more worthy of publication than weaker or non-
significant correlations. However, one advantage of fram-
ing experimental results as continuous-valued instead of
binary is that there may be multiple opposing directions
in which a result could be considered positive. For ex-
ample, the expression of two genes could be correlated,
uncorrelated, or anticorrelated. Both correlation and an-
ticorrelation might be seen as positive results, whereas
the null result of no correlation could be subject to pub-
lication bias. But suppose there is truly no effect: what
does publication bias do in this case? We would expect
to see false positives in both directions. Meta-analysis
would readily pick up the lack of a consistent direction of
the effect, and (if the authors avoid mistakenly inferring
population heterogeneity) it is unlikely that correlations
in either direction would be falsely canonized as fact.
Our model assumes that research continues until each
claim is either rejected or canonized as fact. In practice,
researchers can and do lose interest in certain claims.
False claims might generate more conflicting results, or
take longer to reach one of the evidentiary thresholds;
either mechanism could lead researchers to move on to
other problems and leave the claim as unresolved. If this
is the case, we might expect that instead of being rejected
or canonized as fact, many false claims might simply be
abandoned.
Another possible difference between the model and the
real world is that we model the evidentiary standards as
symmetric, but in practice it may require less certainty
to discard a claim as false than it requires to accept the
same claim as fact. In this case, the probability of reject-
ing false claims would be higher than predicted in our
model—possibly with only a very small increase in the
probability of rejecting true claims.
The scientific community could also actively respond
to the problem of canonizing false claims. One of the
most direct ways would be to invest more heavily in the
publication of negative results. A number of new jour-
nals or collections within journals have been established
to specialize in publishing negative results. This includes
Elsevier’s New Negatives in Plant Science, PLOS One’s
Positively Negative collection, Biomed Central’s Jour-
nal of Negative Results in Biomedicine, and many others
[54]. Alternatively, peer reviewed publication may be un-
necessary; simply publishing negative results on preprint
archives such as the arXiv, bioRxiv, and SocArXiv may
make these results sufficiently visible. In either case, we
face an incentive problem: if researchers accrue scant
credit or reward for their negative findings, there is little
reason for them to invest the substantial time needed in
taking a negative result from a bench-top disappointment
to a formal publication.
Another possibility—which may already be in play—
involves shifting probabilities of publishing negative re-
sults. We have shown that if negative results become
easier to publish as a claim becomes better established,
this can greatly reduce the probability of canonizing false
claims. One possibility is that negative results may be-
come easier to publish as they become more surprising
to the community, i.e., as researchers become increas-
ingly convinced that a claim is true. Referees and jour-
nal editors could make an active effort to value papers
of this sort. At present, however, our experience sug-
gests that negative results or even corrections of blatant
errors in previous publications rarely land in journals of
equal prestige to those that published the original posi-
tive studies [55].
A final saving grace is that even after false claims are
established as facts, science can still self-correct. In this
paper, we have assumed for simplicity that claims are in-
dependent propositions, but in practice claims are entan-
gled in a web of logical interrelations. When a false claim
is canonized as fact, inconsistencies between it and other
facts soon begin to accumulate until the field is forced
to reevaluate the conflicting facts. Results that resolve
these conflicts by disproving accepted facts then take on a
special significance and suffer little of the stigma placed
upon negative results. Until the scientific community
finds more ways to deal with publication bias, this may
be an essential corrective to a process that sometimes
loses its way.
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